Prof Paul Maylam, Rhodes University’s head of the history department, was a 12-year-old boy in an English prep school on 21 March 1960. “All we saw was a picture of it in the newspaper,” he said.
On Tuesday, in the latest edition of the Humanities seminar series, he discussed the events that unfolded on the day of the Sharpeville Massacre.
Prof Paul Maylam, Rhodes University’s head of the history department, was a 12-year-old boy in an English prep school on 21 March 1960. “All we saw was a picture of it in the newspaper,” he said.
On Tuesday, in the latest edition of the Humanities seminar series, he discussed the events that unfolded on the day of the Sharpeville Massacre.
Maylam presented his ideas on whether the massacre was a pre-meditated assault by the “vicious apartheid state” or a “massacre by mistake, brought about in an atmosphere of fear and panic”.
In discussing the short and longterm impact of the massacre, he noted that “Sharpeville has been viewed as one of the key watershed events in the history of 20th century South Africa, altering the course of the liberation struggle, and creating a cyclical pattern of resistance followed by increased repression that would continue for the next 30 years.”
In 1959, ANC president Albert Lutuli had promised that 1960 would be “a year of destiny”. Following the massacre, the apartheid state was shaken.
The ANC declared 28 March a national day of mourning and, on 30 March, the apartheid government declared a state of emergency, banning the ANC and the PAC, and detaining 18 000 people.
On 9 April, there was an assassination attempt on President Hendrik Verwoerd. “There was a deep sense of fear in South Africa,” said Maylam.
“There was a constant expectation of disaster and ‘white panic’. Guns were being sold out, and the army was called to guard police stations.”
The events at Sharpeville catalysed the shift from passive resistance to armed resistance. “The massacre internationalised the struggle against apartheid.
International pressure escalated. It was the bloody outcome of passive resistance,” said Maylam. Sharpeville
marked a turning point in South Africa’s history.
After being condemned by the United Nations on 1 April 1960 and by the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961, the country found itself increasingly isolated in the international community.
Five months after the massacre, £500-million had been taken out of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, crippling South Africa’s economy.
In the UK, there were boycotts against all South African products, and the US imposed a selective arms ban. By 1964, the South African Defence Force had grown by 600%.
“There was a strong sense of vulnerability of the state,” said Maylam. “It was like shaking a granite wall.” He discussed three different narrative explanations for the horrific event which was followed by international consequences.
“The official explanation is that the police were confronted by a violent mob and that they shot in self-defence.
The PAC had orchestrated the march in the hopes of getting a bloody outcome.” This explanation could well have been warped by the apartheid government’s strong hold on the media.
“There is no evidence for this narrative,” said Maylam. “It was later found that the police had fabricated evidence by planting knives in the pockets of the dead.”
“The second explanation, the liberation narrative, holds that there was no violent attempt. It emphasises the premeditation of the police, but there is no evidence of this either.”
The third explanation the idea of “the massacre as a mistake” does not hold true for Maylam. “Something like this cannot be written off as a mistake.
It was a consequence of ‘terror and error’.” Maylam emphasised that “Sharpeville can only be understood in the context of apartheid.”
Since then, the police have admitted that they would not have shot at a white crowd. “They shot like hunters shoot at game,” said Maylam.“There was no order, no warning, and no teargas. There was also no remorse; no regret.”
